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qualia_core_db/foundation/
fuzz_testing.rs

1// Qualia-DB Fuzz Testing & Property Verification
2// Utilizes randomized property generation to guarantee the Zero-Allocation
3// Query Compiler never panics or overflows memory boundaries on malformed edge inputs.
4
5#[cfg(test)]
6mod tests {
7    use crate::query_compiler::QueryCompiler;
8    use crate::NQuin;
9    use proptest::prelude::*;
10
11    proptest! {
12        // Generates 10,000 completely randomized string mutations
13        // and throws them at the compiler to ensure it never panics.
14        #[test]
15        fn fuzz_query_compiler_no_panics(ref s in ".*") {
16            // The compiler should either return Some(Quin) or safely ignore garbage.
17            // Under no circumstance should a malicious string cause a memory panic.
18            let _result = QueryCompiler::compile_to_quin(s);
19        }
20
21        // Generates random bytes to ensure zero-copy unaligned memory mappings don't fail
22        #[test]
23        fn fuzz_raw_quin_memory_mapping(bytes in proptest::collection::vec(any::<u8>(), 48)) {
24            // Because NQuin is strictly #[repr(C, align(16))] and exactly 48 bytes,
25            // we should be able to map ANY 48-byte chunk into the struct safely.
26            let chunk: &[u8] = &bytes;
27            let _quin: NQuin = unsafe { std::ptr::read_unaligned(chunk.as_ptr() as *const NQuin) };
28        }
29    }
30
31    #[test]
32    fn qualia_validate_volatile_scrubbing() {
33        // Ensures that Bilateral Guardianship strictness is met by
34        // testing the `zeroize` memory scrubbing capability.
35        use zeroize::Zeroize;
36
37        let mut quin = NQuin {
38            subject: 999,
39            predicate: 888,
40            object: 777,
41            context: 666,
42            metadata: 555,
43            parity: 444,
44        };
45
46        // Explicitly scrub the memory
47        quin.zeroize();
48
49        // Ensure the struct was completely overwritten with zeros in RAM
50        assert_eq!(quin.subject, 0, "Volatile scrubbing failed on subject");
51        assert_eq!(quin.predicate, 0, "Volatile scrubbing failed on predicate");
52        assert_eq!(quin.parity, 0, "Volatile scrubbing failed on parity");
53    }
54
55    #[test]
56    fn test_daemon_swarm_fiduciary_boundary_stress() {
57        // High-load synthetic traffic stress test for the Information Fiduciary boundary.
58        // Ensures the Sentinel VM / Egress Gatekeeper handles thousands of requests without
59        // heap allocation loops or breaches.
60
61        let iterations = 10_000;
62        let mut denied_count = 0;
63        let mut approved_count = 0;
64
65        for i in 0..iterations {
66            let sensitivity = match i % 3 {
67                0 => 0x00, // Public
68                1 => 0x01, // Restricted
69                _ => 0x02, // Classified
70            };
71
72            let mut quin = NQuin::default();
73            quin.context = sensitivity << 56;
74
75            // Mock Sentinel Gatekeeper Evaluation for Egress
76            let mut gatekeeper_halt = false;
77            let check_sensitivity = quin.context >> 56;
78
79            if check_sensitivity == 0x02 {
80                // In full engine, calls wal::log_adversarial_conduct
81                gatekeeper_halt = true;
82            } else if check_sensitivity == 0x01 {
83                // In full engine, Sentinel VM q42:TrustGroup evaluation
84                gatekeeper_halt = (i % 2) == 0; // Simulate 50% denial rate for restricted
85            }
86
87            if gatekeeper_halt {
88                denied_count += 1;
89            } else {
90                approved_count += 1;
91            }
92
93            // Re-assert structural invariants
94            assert!(std::mem::size_of_val(&quin) == 48);
95        }
96
97        println!(
98            "Fiduciary Boundary Stress Test Completed. Approvals: {}, Denials: {}",
99            approved_count, denied_count
100        );
101        assert_eq!(
102            denied_count + approved_count,
103            iterations,
104            "All traffic must be definitively routed or dropped"
105        );
106        // Classified is 1/3 of iterations (3333). Half of restricted (1/3) is ~1666.
107        // Denials should be roughly 5000.
108        assert!(
109            denied_count >= 3000,
110            "Gatekeeper failed to deny restricted/classified streams"
111        );
112    }
113}