Expand description
Mechanism design: individual rationality, budget balance, VCG payments, and strategy-proofness checks.
Allocation class: HotZeroHeap. No Vec/String/Box in any kernel.
Assumptions:
- Quasilinear utility:
u_i = v_i(allocation) - payment_i. - Private values (each agent knows their own valuation).
- Risk-neutral agents.
Structs§
- Mechanism
Report - Mechanism property report.
Enums§
Constants§
- MAX_
AGENTS - Maximum agents in a bounded mechanism.
Functions§
- check_
budget_ balance - Check budget balance: returns
(is_balanced, net_transfer). - check_
individual_ rationality - Check individual rationality: every agent’s payment must be <= their valuation (no agent loses by participating).
- check_
strategy_ proofness_ 2x2 - Check strategy-proofness for a 2-agent, 2-type mechanism using precomputed allocation and payment tables.
- mechanism_
report - Compute a mechanism report: IR, budget balance, total payment, and surplus.
- vickrey_
clarke_ groves_ payment_ into - VCG (Clarke pivot) payment for single-item allocation to highest bidder.