Expand description
Fixed-field signed envelope for caller-owned sensing evidence.
The envelope signs a versioned, domain-separated SHA-256 commitment. A valid signature authenticates the signed declaration only; trusted policy must separately authorize the source/adapter, consent decision and revocation state, and calibration artifact. Neither signature nor policy proves that a physical measurement is scientifically true.
Re-exports§
pub use SignedSensingEvidencePolicy as SignedEvidencePolicy;
Structs§
- Capture
Timestamp - Capture time in an explicit monotonic clock domain. This is not UTC; the grant policy must not compare it to a wall-clock expiry without an explicit authenticated clock conversion.
- Signed
Evidence Authenticator - Binds one signed envelope to trusted policy and samples trusted time on each authentication or calibration check.
- Signed
Sensing Evidence - Versioned signed evidence record. Fields are private to prevent post-signing
mutation outside the module; use
verifybefore consuming it.
Enums§
Constants§
Traits§
- Signed
Sensing Evidence Policy - Trusted caller policy. Implementations must verify exact grant/decision binding and current revocation state, source-key authorization for this source/adapter/epoch tuple, and calibration reference-to-digest identity. These hooks do not assert that a correctly signed sensor statement is physically true.
- Trusted
Evidence Clock - Trusted current UTC source used for grant expiry checks.
Functions§
- digest_
calibration_ artifact - Domain-separated digest for calibration artifact bytes. A policy resolver
must confirm that this digest names the artifact in
SensingEvidence; signing the digest alone is not calibration validation. - digest_
payload - Domain-separated digest for raw payload bytes. This helper allocates no memory; callers must hash the exact immutable payload that the envelope references, and the evidence policy must bind that digest to its record.